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Between 1916 and 1920, the Labor Government in Queensland 
purchased a number of cattle stations in the northern and western 
districts of the State. Costing one and a half million pounds, the 
stations covered an area larger than Tasmania. Ten years later they 
had all been disposed of, leaving an estimated debt of nearly two 
million pounds and a lasting reputation of commercial failure 
brought about by gross mismanagement. 
This paper traces the history of the Queensland Labor 
Government's unique attempt to found a state-owned and operated 
pastoral empire. In outlining the difficulties encountered, the 
comparative position of private land-owners, the efficacy of a policy 
of public ownership and the performance of the managers, it 
examines some possible reasons for the reputation the State Pastoral 
Stations acquired and whether or not it was deserved. 
Ms Kay Cohen, B.A., B.Soc.Stud. was this year awarded a Master's Degree by the 
University of Queensland for a thesis on "The Administration of Queensland's Trading 
Enterprises, 1915-1920." 
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THE CONCEPT OF STATE TRADING ENTERPRISES 
At the end of 1915, the newly-elected Labor Government in 
Queensland under the leadership of T.J. Ryan, began to estabhsh a 
number of State-owned Trading Enterprises. They included Butcher 
Shops, a Hotel, Canneries, Sawmills, Coal Mines, Fish Shops and 
Pastoral Stations. 
Labor's fighting platform for both the 1913 and 1915 elections had 
outlined proposals for economic reform which rested on State 
control of the means of production and distribution — the 
controversial "Socialist Objective". There was to be, for instance, a 
State Export Department, State Shipping Line and State 
Steelworks. There was no reference to butcher shops, cattle stations 
or the other trading ventures. Yet it was these, rather than the grand 
ideologically-conceived ventures that formed the basis for Labor's 
experiment in taking on private enterprise at its own game. 
Whether or not the State Trading Enterprises of this period 
represented the first step on the road to nationalised industry, as 
many at the time believed, remains a debatable point. Some writers 
have labelled them "miscellaneous" or "meat and fish shop" 
socialism.' Other have damned with faint praise, concluding that 
they operated on too small a scale to have had any chance of 
infiuencing the economy^. Certainly the rank and file of the Party 
believed in worker control of industry while Theodore, as Treasurer 
and later Premier, was a driving force in planning for the expansion 
of state ownership. Ryan, on the other hand, was a pragmatist. For 
him, establishing State Enterprises was just one of the means of 
consolidating popular support and maintaining Labor in power. 
Despite the importance given to labor's ideological position at that 
time, the 1915 election in Queensland was said to have been won on 
the basis of one slogan "Cheap bread, beef and butter."^ Ryan had 
astutely identified a major, long-standing grievance of most sections 
of Queensland's population—the scarcity and high price of meat. 
Measures taken by previous governments had proved unsuccessful 
and the problem was compounded by the outbreak of World War I 
when Queensland as Australia's foremost beef producer was 
contracted to supply meat for the Imperial Fighting Forces. 
For Ryan's purposes, international companies, such as the 
American Meat Trust, were cast as the villains. They were depicted 
as combining to force up the price, not just of meat but of all basic 
foodstuffs, causing hardship for the worker and his family. It had 
proved impossible to enforce regulated pricing so, to break the meat 
supply monopoly, the Government decided to set up its own butcher 
shops. It was believed that State-owned businesses would run more 
efficiently and cheaply because they eliminated the 'profiteering' 
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middleman or agent and because the employees would work harder 
to serve the best interests of their fellow workers. With the State 
retailing cheaper meat, private enterprise would be forced, "through 
legitimate competition" to lower its prices.* 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF STATE PASTORAL STATIONS 
From State Butcher Shops, it was a short step for the Government 
to consider the advantages of providing its own meat supplies. 
Already on at least one occasion the meat companies had refused to 
supply the State Butcher Shops. With its own source of supply, the 
Government would no longer be dictated to by the private combines 
and trusts, and could even begin to formulate what it saw as a more 
rational approach to the problems of meat production and 
distribution in Queensland. It was envisaged that the Government 
would control a chain of pastoral properties in different areas of the 
state. By moving stock between the different properties when 
necessary, the huge losses caused through periodic drought could be 
avoided. 
Moreover, if enough land was brought under central government 
control with a singular management policy directed towards serving 
the public interest, the result would be a level of beef productoin 
sufficient to supply the domestic market at lower prices and build up 
a substantial export trade. Because private landholders were isolated 
units, subject to the vagaries of chmate and economic conditions and 
competing against one another for a share of a capricious market,^ 
it followed that the pastoral industry was operating inefficiently. 
In 1916, Alexander McGugan was appointed from a field of 200 
applicants to the position of General Manager of the State Stations 
Enterprise. The Enterprise functioned within, but as a separate 
branch, of the Department of Lands and McGugan was directly 
responsible to Hunter, the Minister for Lands. Hunter was also 
entrusted with the task of overseeing the establishment of all the 
State Trading Enterprises. 
With what appeared to be an unusual amount of independent 
authority, McGugan set about fulfilling his brief from Hunter to 
purchase the proposed chain of pastoral properties. By 1920 he had 
acquired for the Government a total of 26 holdings comprising more 
than 30,000 sq. miles and running 173,000 cattle. The cost had been 
just under 1.5 million pounds. 
McGugan had not only laid the foundation for state intervention 
in the pastoral industry in Queensland but had also secured a 
substantial reservoir of beef supplies. 
The years from 1916 to 1918 were favourable for the State Stations 
and for the pastoral industry in general. Good seasons and high 
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QUEENSLAND STATE PASTORAL STATIONS: 
MAJOR PURCHASES 1916-20 
Station 
Mt. Hutton 
Dillalah 
Wandovale 
Dotswood 
Brooklyn & 
Maitland Downs 
Merluna & 
York Downs 
Silver Plains 
Dunbar 
Vanrook 
Stirling 
Strathmore 
Macaroni 
Lyndhurst 
Buckingham Downs 
Alderley 
Keeroongooloo 
Kenmore 
Monamby 
Diamantina Lakes 
Abbotsford 
Kuparee 
Year 
1916 
1916 
1916 
1916 
1916 
1916 
1916 
1917) 
1917) 
1917) 
1917) 
1918 
1918 
1918 
1919 
1919 
1919 
1919 
1919 
1920 
1920 
No. of 
Cattle 
10,243 
3,711 
12,730 
14,422) 
) 
6,381) 
) 
12,960) 
2,195) 
45,277 
7,619 
24,527 
16,378 
— 
11,957 
43 
2,000 
— 
— 
2,815 
Price* 
(Pounds) 
73,500 
51,961 
82,000 
228,000 
263,000 
31,000 
170,000 
140,000 
9,000 
156,000 
20,000 
20,500 
5,000) 
1,900) 
12,000) 
(Lease & 
Improve-
ments) 
*As all these properties were leasehold, the major part of the 
purchase price represented payments for stock and improvements. 
Source: Annual Report of the Commissioner for Trade 1920, QPP. 
1030, Vol 2, p.66. 
world prices ensured a buoyant market. What had been a 
controversial decision, even within the ranks of the Labor Party 
itself, appeared to be justified as the price of meat came down and 
the Butcher Shops and the Cattle Stations showed a trading profit. 
This early success had, however, little to do with the increased 
business efficiency and the breaking-up of private monopoly that 
State ownership promised. It arose more from the capacity of Ryan, 
the pragmatist, to grasp the opportunities offering at the time. 
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In 1916, the Queensland government had been appointed agent for 
the Imperial Forces Meat Supply Contracts. When Ryan went to 
London that same year, he was able to negotiate more favourable 
terms for the Queensland meat companies. In return, they agreed to 
supply a set tonnage of meat annually to the State Butcher Shops 
at a price below the fixed wholesale rate. Consequently, it became 
far more profitable for the State Stations to sell their cattle to the 
Meat Companies for the higher price paid under the Imperial 
Contracts.^ As one Opposition member succinctly put it to 
Parliament, "not one hoof" from the State Stations was sold through 
the State Butcher Shops. Another opportunity for the State Stations 
to gain an advantage over private competitors came through the 
Government ignoring the embargo it had placed on the sale of cattle 
to the Southern States. It was revealed that almost the entire stock 
of 9,000 cattle from the newly-acquired Mt. Hutton State Station, 
as well as 3000 from Dillalah and other State Stations near 
Charleville, had been sold at a considerable profit to N.S.W. buyers.'' 
The success of the Legislative Council in defeating the Meatworks 
Bills of 1915 and 1917, as well as the Commissioner for Trade Bill of 
1916, meant that the Government had so far failed to establish a 
legislative base for the State Enterprises. But such was the general 
popularity of its "cheap meat" facilities that in 1917 Hunter detailed 
Ross, the State Butchery Supervisor and Imperial Meat Officer, to 
draw up a meat supply plan for the whole of Queensland. By 
establishing pastoral stations, meatworks and butcher shops at 
strategic centres on or near railway lines, the government could 
control production and distribution and thus ensure adequate 
supplies of cheap meat for the entire population. 
Ross's carefully researched scheme^ received the enthusiastic 
endorsement of Caucus and Cabinet. It was one of Labor's first 
attempts at rational and comprehensive economic planning but the 
cost of £2 milhon (not including the price of pastoral stations) was 
prohibitive at a time when government financial commitments were 
rapidly escalating and the State Enterprises had already incurred a 
public debt of nearly £1 million. The scheme never eventuated but 
the Government was not deterred from purchasing more cattle 
stations, even though Theodore had warned Ryan that there was no 
more cash available, and in Caucus meetings strong opposition to the 
State Stations was voiced by several Party members, chief among 
whom was McCormack. However, so long as stock could be sold to 
the Meat Companies at more than its cost price and supplies did not 
diminish, there appeared to be no urgent reason to question the 
decision for further expansion. 
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Following a significant electoral vistory in 1918, Labor made 
another attempt to have legislation providing for State Enterprises 
passed by Parliament. The Legislative Council finally approved a 
much amended State Enterprises Act in December, 1918. The Act 
provided for nominated State Enterprises, among them the State 
Stations, to be administered as a single entity, the State Trade Office, 
under a Commissioner for Trade. The former Chief Audit Inspector, 
WH. Austin, was appointed to the position. State Enterprises' 
administration had some aspects of a public corporation. Their 
finances were separated from the public account and the 
Commissioner was vested with the powers of a corporation—he 
could appoint staff, sign contracts, and sue and be sued in the same 
way as a private person. In other aspects, however. Labor's well-
recognised aversion to vesting independent authority in appointed 
officials was evident. Despite its considerable emphasis on the need 
for the State Enterprises to have operational independence and 
protection from political interference, the Government also argued 
for a significant measure of control, a stance the Legislative Council 
did not undermine in proposing amendments to the Bill. 
Consequently, the Commissioner's authority was restricted by the 
appointment of a Minister responsible for administering the 
Enterprises, by the Governor-in-Council's power of veto, and by the 
introduction of a central accounting system structured according to 
the requirements of the Auditor-General. 
For Labor's opponents, the aim of the Act was to impose pubhc 
accountability on the Enterprises' operations, and nowhere was this 
more apphcable than in the case of the State Stations. The Auditor-
General's persistent campaign to compel financial accountability 
from the Enterprises had been provoked largely by the failure of the 
State Stations' management to demonstrate any reliable method of 
accounting. Both the public inquiries into aspects of the State 
Enterprises conducted in 1917^  heard evidence that the individual 
managers controlled day-to-day operations, and there was no 
rehable means of checking overall revenue and expenditure. The 
State Stations were now directed by the Auditor-General to submit 
stock valuations and profit and loss balance sheets on a monthly 
basis. 
While these measures went some way to answering public criticism 
of the Stations' lack of accountability, an equally pressing problem 
lay in demonstrating that they were competing on an equal footing 
with private enterprise. To this end, interest was charged on the 
Stations' overdraft at the Treasury. Previously exempt from all land 
use charges, each Station was placed on a similar footing to private 
landholders in making payments to local authorities for rates and for 
the control of pests and noxious weeds. Similarly, annual rents 
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assessed on land valuations were payable to the Department of 
Lands. The latter provision removed one of the major advantages the 
Stations had enjoyed over the pastoralists who had already had to 
absorb a sharp increase in rents under the Labor government. 
To all intends and purposes, the State Stations had been placed on 
the same operating basis as private pastoral stations. Even if they had 
not been used as intended—to supply the State Butcher Shops—and 
they carried an unwieldy capital debt, sufficient proof of their 
commercial viability lay for the Government in the annual net profit 
they had so far returned. 
THE DOWNHILL SLIDE 
However, in 1920 changes occurred which revealed the 
insubstantial nature of this success. The end of World War I had 
meant the end of the Imperial Forces Meat Contracts and the lifting 
of the embargo on interstate cattle sales. The government was able 
to renew its "cheap meat" agreement with the Meat Companies but 
at a cost. State Stations' cattle now had to compete on the open 
market and were not to be sold interstate. 
Nor did the State Bucher Shops provide more than an occasional 
outlet even when the Meat Companies' agreement finally ended in 
1921, since it was cheaper and more reliable for the Shops to buy at 
the public saleyards or directly from private producers. 
The world slump in cattle prices in 1920 devastated Queensland's 
beef industry and virtually signalled the end for the State Stations. 
There was a drastic writing down of stock values for the year. Despite 
a similar reaction across the whole industry, the Auditor-General 
was not convinced that such a step was entirely warranted. Stock 
valuation levels were to prove a crucial weakness in the State Stations 
accounts, for in 1917, the Auditor-General had claimed that the 
Treasurer's calculation of a net profit for the Stations could have only 
been achieved by setting stock values too high. In an interim report 
to Parliament in 1921, he attacked the State Stations' accounting 
system and all but labelled the valuations as fraudulent. His claim 
was immediately refuted by the Trade Commissioner in his Annual 
Report.'" But other irregularities surfaced. 20,000 cattle had been 
written off through death in 1919 and again in 1920 while a report 
issued by the recently dismissed pastoral inspector for the State 
Stations claimed 50,000 head were missing on the northern 
stations." 
Allegations of mismanagement intensified. McGugan resigned 
and the new General Manager J. Barr undertook a famiharisation 
tour with the Trade Commissioner. They found several instances of 
incompetent and fraudulent management and it was clear that 
neither the Trade Commissioner nor McGugan had been able to 
exert the necessary control over the Stations' day-to-day operations. 
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Together with the mounting debt and falling stock prices, their 
findings put paid to any dream Labor might have had of reforming 
the beef production industry through State ownership. Several 
stations were amalgamated,'^ and management was now directed 
towards a holding operation until stocks could be sold off and some 
of the losses recouped. 
By 1924, the Stations' debt to the Treasury had risen to nearly $2 
million and the trading losses of the previous year had reached a high 
point of $170,000. Forgan Smith, who as Minister for Public Works, 
now had responsibility for the State Enterprises, declared 
"something must be done." He recommended that over half a million 
pounds in accumulated losses should be written off their capital 
debt.'3 Cabinet's ready acceptance of his proposal lent support to the 
view that, given the generally adverse economic chmate and their 
poor commercial performance, the Stations were unlikely to trade 
out of their deficit situation. Even with the benefit of a reduced debt 
and lower interest payments, their financial position in the fohowing 
twelve months deteriorated to such an extent that it was no surprise 
when in 1926, with an election imminent, McCormack announced 
the Stations would be sold. McCormack had become Premier at a 
time when Labor faced increasing economic difficulties and waning 
electoral support. From the beginning an outspoken opponent of 
State ownership of pastoral properties,''' he now had confirmation 
of their political hability for the Party and their increasing irrelevance 
to resolving the problems of primary production. The Lands 
Department also began to exert considerable pressure on the 
Government to follow its ideological commitment to closer land 
settlement, which had much to recommend it in terms of popular 
support and an increase in revenue. The previous year, when the 
decision to sell was first mooted, the Department had increased the 
Stations' rents and had prepared plans for opening the runs for 
selection. Following lengthy negotiations between Austin and 
Melville, the Under Secretary of the Lands Department, Austin was 
able to carry his argument that long leases and lower annual rents 
would make the Stations a more attractive sales proposition. The 
appearance of planning for closer settlement was maintained when 
three of the runs were retained by the Lands Department for 
subdivision and the others advertised in the Government Gazette as 
open to the public for pastoral lease. Granted priority of application, 
the Trade Commissioner was issued with consolidated leases for a 
thirty-year period, with reduced rents for the marginal grazing runs. 
A further struggle with the Lands Department secured the waiving 
of the Crown's resumption rights for fifteen years.'^ 
Ahhough Austin had assured Cabinet he could find suitable 
buyers privately, criticism of the secrecy still surrounding State 
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Enterprises' operations dictated a public sale. Pastoral agents 
Dalgety and Co. tried with two auctions in 1927 and then in 1929, 
but only managed to sell a few of the smaller runs. It was generally 
held that the reserve prices were set too high."' In the meantime, 
drought had again depleted the stock. Much of what remained was 
sold off to reduce the trading deficit, and by 1930 all the stations had 
been disposed of privately, on very favourable terms for the buyer. 
The incoming Moore Country-Nationahst-Progressive Coalition 
Government lost no time in making political capital out of the State 
Enterprises' overall losses and the particular example of the State 
Stations. The Enterprises' total net loss in trading and realisation of 
assets was £ 1,800,000, £ 1,600,000 of which the Stations had incurred. 
Moreover, the Stations' Treasury debt stood at £1 million, with an 
additional £1 mUlion in accumulated losses written off, as well as the 
unpaid interest on those losses.'^ The Moore Government calculated 
the Stations had wasted more than two million pounds of pubhc 
money, which was indeed proof for the anti-Labor forces that "the 
proper role of government was to govern", to assist private 
enterprise, not compete with it. The formal demise of State-owned 
pastoral stations and all the trading enterprises administered by the 
Commissioner for Trade was marked by the passing of "The State 
Enterprises Repeal Act of 1931".'* 
MISMANAGEMENT? 
Why did the State Stations fail so badly? The historical view has 
tended to cite mismanagement. But did this simply mean the 
managers were incompetent and dishonest or was there a wider 
connotation? Space does not aUow a full exploration of the question 
but, as aspects of the Stations' operations have already shown, their 
failure had a more complex cause than could be explained away by 
blaming the managers. 
Murphy, for instance, did single out "inadequate management" in 
an industry where "the most competent managers" were essential, 
but went on to acknowledge other contributing factors: "[the 
Stations] suffered from unsuitable purchases made on what seemed 
to be reasonable commercial grounds and [they] were the victims of 
the economic problems that confronted similar private enterprises 
and caused financial losses in the 1920's".'5 
As individual holdings, the Stations were all considered to be 
reasonably viable propositions at the time of purchase. From the 
numerous properties offered to the Government, those McGugan 
chose were long-established. Most carried extensive improvements 
with stations such as Lyndhurst and Dunbar being noted for their 
well-equipped homesteads and gardens, while Wando Vale and 
Dotswood were renowned fattening properites. The particular 
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stations were attractive to the Government because of the high stock 
numbers and because the vendors had agreed to take part payment 
in Government debentures maturing over twenty years. 
But together the Stations were too vast, too dispersed and too 
expensive. Pastoralist members of Parliament, many of whom had 
experienced the rise and fall of fortunes on the land, claimed the 
Government purchases had forced up the price of land and stock. 
They believed the State's entry into the pastoral industry to be poorly 
conceived and gave the venture little chance of success. As one stock 
and station agent giving evidence before the Legislative Council 
Select Committee of Inquiry in 1917 correctly predicted, the 
Government could not lose if the high prices continued but if prices 
fell then the Stations "would lose more than the man adjoining 
them."2o 
Queensland's pastoral history tended to support these views. The 
pattern of pastoral development had been one of advance and then 
retreat in the face of adversity. The runs which became State Stations 
were ah taken up in the successive waves of expansion that spread 
out from the coast to the north and far west after 1859, but many 
were abandoned at various times because of difficult conditions and 
consequent financial ruin for their owners.2' This was particularly 
evident in the Gulf and Channel rivers' country where seasons of 
great promise would give way to prolonged drought, forcing all but 
the wealthiest off the land. It also showed that Queensland's pastoral 
industry would inevitably depend on conditions of high demand both 
locally and on the world markets. Thus, stations such as Dotswood, 
Lyndhurst, Wando Vale and Brooklyn were successful because they 
supplied the local demand created by the gold discoveries around the 
Star and Lynd Rivers and Mt Molloy, while York Downs and 
Merluna in the far north of Cape York were taken up to supply the 
island beef trade. Ah who took up the challenge of the land had to 
battle shortage of labour, lack of permanent water, stock disease, 
transport problems and sharp falls in market prices. The State 
Stations were no exception and they shared most of the problems 
that had beset their private owners. 
Runs with permanent water were insulated from the worst effect 
of drought and where they were situated in an area of high demand, 
they were able to prosper. The drawback was that these runs were 
much sought after. Under both private and State ownership, there 
was constant pressure for blocks to be resumed and opened for 
selection. Initially the State Stations benefitted from the resumption 
provisions of the Land Acts when resumed land on Lyndhurst, 
Dotswood, Diamantina Lakes and Buckingham Downs was 
withdrawn from selection and added to the existing area of the 
Stations.22 Similarly, Abbotsford Station was resumed and added to 
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Keeroongooloo in 1920 although the Trade Commissioner never paid 
the mandatory compensation for improvements. However, when the 
Stations were to be sold, it was a different story. The intransigence 
of the Lands Department, particularly with its insistence on valuing 
the remote stations on the basis of peak seasons production proved 
costly. In the case of Keeroongooloo station, a firm offer from the 
previous lessees, Field and Vicary, at more than double the price 
eventuaUy obtained, was lost for this reason.^3 
In general, problems of security of tenure, level of annual rents, 
and improvement requirements such as fencing and the sinking of 
water bores, were common to both private and public owner. 
However, no private owner had attempted land holding on such a 
vast scale. Some pastorahsts had tried to follow a similar path of 
acquiring both breeding and fattening properties. The early land 
acquisitions of Towns and Black spread out from Townsville to the 
Northern Territory border but did not survive the economic reverses 
of the 1870's. Sidney Kidman's empire expanded up from South 
Australia to include the large holdings around Cooper's Creek as 
well as fattening stations in the Peak Downs area. In 1910, he 
acquired what was to become Diamantina Lakes State Station, but 
by 1918 he had failed to comply with the improvements conditions 
on that station and a number of others. In a letter to the Lands 
Department, he admitted he had lost his grasp on their day-to-day 
management and was more than ready to transfer any of them to the 
Queensland Government.^'* It was not until the large pastoral 
companies, backed by financial institutions looking to invest funds 
across a wide range of business activities, entered the industry that 
the scale of land holding attempted by the Labor Government proved 
to be commercially viable. 
Obviously then, one major prerequisite for survival in the pastoral 
industry was sustained funding to carry over the bad seasons and 
provide for development. As May found, in comparing capital 
investment in the pastoral industry in Queensland with that of other 
States during this period, a great percentage of runs in Queensland 
were mortgaged to the banks and financial institutions or were 
owned and managed by them.^s Buckingham Downs was first settled 
by Alexander Kennedy in the 1870's foUowing his race with 
Allingham of Chatsworth and Rocklands stations to take up prime 
grazing land in the Channel country. It was abandoned a few years 
later, taken up again in the 1880's, became the property of the 
Queensland National Bank after the droughts of the 1890's and 
remained so until transferred to the State Stations in 1918. Dotswood 
which had been owned briefly by Sir Thomas Mcllwraith in the 
1880's also came into the Banks's hands as a result of the 1893 
drought. The Groongal Pastoral Co. which had held 
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Keeroongooloo, and the Van Rook Pastoral Co. with the vast 
Dunbar, Van Rook and Strathmore runs went into liquidation in 
1914, while Macartney, the leader of the Opposition in 1918, who had 
held Diamantina Lakes since 1886, failed to survive the expense of 
re-stocking after losing 15,000 cattle in the droughts of 1893 and 1902 
and sold out to Kidman in 1910.^ 6 
It was the huge capital outlay required to build up the empire of 
the State Stations that proved an insurmountable barrier to their 
achieving any level of commercial viability. The 1918 State 
Enterprises' Act provided for estabhshment costs to be covered by 
a Treasury loan at 5'/4% interest, repayable over 40 years. Labor, 
promoting the benefits of public ownership, expected the Stations to 
be self-supporting from the start and generate a trading profit to 
cover all capital payments and working expenses with reserve funds 
for development. Even after the market slump in 1920 the 
Government maintained these unrealistic expectations, ignoring the 
Auditor-General's advice that state enterprise, like private 
enterprise, should not be expected to make a profit immediately. 
Particularly in the case of the State Stations, he considered interest 
and redemption payments should be waived until the enterprise was 
stabilised.2' With no such relief available, the initial capital debt 
mounted as trading losses were added to it, causing interest payments 
and working expenses also to increase to the point where it was no 
longer possible to trade out of the situation. The Stations' banker was 
the Treasury and although it "carried" the Stations for a number of 
years, it was inevitable that it would foreclose on the debt as the 
general economic crisis grew worse and the Government faced 
intense criticism of the wastage of pubhc funds on the State Stations. 
It has been noted elsewhere that a high level of capital debt with 
no hope of reducing it was counter to managerial efficiency.^s 
Another writer in discussing the private management of North 
Queensland cattle stations refers to the detrimental effect of absentee 
owners: "This often leads to an unreal management policy fixed 
rather by office ideas and southern experience than on the merits and 
demerits of land and cattle involved. A lack of cohesion results and 
managers tend to become apathetic. "^ ^ Together with problems of 
distance, communication, and difficulty in identifying with the 
Stations' rather tarnished objective, an irreducible debt and absentee 
ownership were further factors impinging on the managers' capacity 
to manage. 
Staffing was another contentious area of State Stations' 
operations. A large percentage of the hands employed were 
aborigines, a situation the Opposition found "strange for an anti-
black Government" and even Caucus voiced its disapproval.^o 
However, the complete dependence of the Queensland pastoral 
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industry on aboriginal labour had long been recognised. In most 
instances, the Government inherited its aboriginal labour force from 
the previous owners although its attempts to continue the tradition 
of reducing white staff to a minimum aroused the anger of at least 
one manager who threatened to resign if it was carried any further. 
The insistence of the trade unions on appointing aU Station hands 
was an added complication for the managers. 
A related problem lay in the low wages paid to pastoral workers 
in Queensland. Despite the Labor Government's stated policy of 
improving the workers' pay and conditions, it was far from an 
exemplary employer, with conditions on the Stations often worse 
than on privately-owned stations. On Keeroongooloo, the workers' 
accommodation was so sub-standard that a private owner would 
have been prosecuted for a breach of The Workers' Accommodation 
Act.3i Aborigines were not covered by industrial awards, their wages 
being set and collected by the Chief Protector of Aborigines, and it 
was alleged that aboriginal boys were sent to work on the State 
Stations as a form of punishment. Curiously enough, the number of 
employees remained at a level that was considered high even in 1918, 
despite the amalgamations and reduction in operations that occurred 
after 1920. Even curioser was Austin's report in 1922 that the 
Arbitration Court, determining an application for increases in the 
Queensland Station Hands' Award, accepted the State Stations' 
costs as a baseline for the whole pastoral industry. 
What of the managers themselves? Available records suggest a 
mixed lot, some good, some bad, but very few able to rise above the 
adverse factors of state ownership, drought and an unstable market. 
The Legislative Council had tried to show McGugan, the General 
Manager, as unfitted for his position when his only experience 
consisted of managing one sheep station. But he had supporters in 
the industry and even Barnes, the Nationalist politician whose family 
held Canning Downs Station, acknowledged in Parhament that he 
was a capable manager and expert cattle buyer.^2 
McGugan, as well as his successor, Barr, laboured under two 
handicaps. The first was the lack of any adequate organisational 
structure for effectively controlhng his far-flung empire. The second, 
the continual political intervention in day-to-day management, so 
affected Barr that despite years of competent service both with the 
State Stations and with other aspects of the Meat Industry in which 
the Trade Commissioner had taken a prominent role, refused to assist 
with the sale of the Stations because he feared the Government were 
"out to get him. "33 
As far as can be gathered from surviving records, some managers 
were stable and respected members of the pastoral industry. 
Bowman, the manager of Wando Vale before and during the period 
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Dunbar station (above) and Brooklyn station (below), both photos taken in the 1920 
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of State ownership retained his place as one of the foremost stud 
breeders in Queensland. Photographs of life on Brooklyn and 
Keeroongooloo show a stable family environment even in the face 
of the difficulties of the 1920's. The other side of the coin could be 
seen in the management of the more remote stations such as Van 
Rook, in the Gulf country. On their inspection tour in 1921, Barr and 
Austin found the manager of Van Rook so infirm that he rarely left 
the head station. Consequently cattle stealing was rife and stock from 
adjoining properties ranged freely on the station. On Merluna 
station, the manager and head stockman had gone into business for 
themselves selhng the State cattle, while instances of free meat and 
overpayment to contractors building improvements, were numerous.3"* 
There were numerous allegations of underhand dealings levelled 
at both the managers and the Government, many of which could be 
substantiated. State Stations' accounting was often an exercise in 
"creative" accounting. The reliability of the final loss figure 
calculated by the Moore Government was clouded by the 
circumstances of both the purchase and sale of the Stations. It was 
agreed throughout the industry that Burns and Johnston who had 
sold the Government five of the Stations, were nothing but 
speculators, and they along with other vendors would not guarantee 
stock numbers. Up to 4000 head were still missing from Dillalah even 
though the Government had included the profit from their sale in the 
Stations' 1917 profits. The stations had been offered to Sir William 
Angliss in 1927 as going concerns but the Government vetoed any 
further negotiations to settle for a public auction and eventual sales 
of less than half the Stations' value. The conditions of sale had been 
considered laughable in the drought conditions of the late 1920's. 
FinaUy, the poor condition of the stations and their stock at this time 
demonstrated the futility of Labor's plan of stabilising meat 
production by controlled use of pastoral land. 
Political intervention was thus an important factor in the 
commercial failure of the Stations. Labor tried to use the Stations 
to achieve a political objective without being clear on the means of 
doing so. The Trade Commissioner, Austin, was a well-respected 
senior official who defended his staff and fought the Government for 
a business-oriented, independent management policy. He was sadly 
out of his depth in administering a cattle empire. 
The State Stations failed for a number of reasons. It was not 
simply a matter of incompetent or dishonest managers. 
In 1917, Frank Cooper, the Labor M.L.A. for Bremer, had 
declared: 
The cattle stations are not for today. The cattle stations are not 
for tomorrow. But they are to build up a great future for the 
Government of this State; build up a great future in the matter of 
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the meat supply not only for the people of Queensland, but in the 
years to come for the whole of the people of Australia.-" 
In the intervening years the same stations have indeed played a 
prominent role in Australia's meat supply industry, but under 
private, not State, ownership. 
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